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Under the method in use up to the present time, the issue of the
JOURNAL which has appeared at the close of the month has been
dated as of the month just ending. The disadvantages of this sys-
.tem have become so obvious that a change has been effeCted. The
present number is dated February instead of January, there being
no issue of that date. There will be no change at present in the
number of issues to a volume or the time of appearance. The ninth
and last number this year will be dated July instead of June as here-
tofore, and the first number next fall will be dated November instead
of October.
ANTI-TRUST LAW-POWER OF CONGRESS TO RESTRICT CONTRACTS IN
RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ADDYSTON PIPE AND
STEEL CO. V. U. S., 20 SUP. CT. REP. 96.
This is one of the most interesting and valuable of the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Peckham
is very lucid in its exposition of the principles upon which a con-
tract restraining competition in bidding for contracts to furnish
goods, to be manufactured by the successful bidder, is a contract in
restraint of trade and not such a monopoly of manufacture merely
COMMENT.
as is held legal in the case of U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., I56 U. S. I.
Of more especial merit, however, is the discussion of the proposition
that the power given by the Constitution to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, was not intended as "a general power to inter-
fere with or prohibit private contracts between citizens, even though
such contracts have interstate commerce for their object and result
in a direct and substantial obstruction to or regulation of that com-
merce." This contention is based on the grounds that the power
was vested in Congress so as to insure uniformity of regulation
against conflicting and discriminating state legislation, and that the
constitutional guaranty of the liberty of private contract is a limita-
tion on the power of Congress to regulate commerce. In answer
the court holds that the power of Congress to legislate is given as a
limitation on the right of contract; that the interference with inter-
state commerce by contract may be as far-reaching as any by state
legislation, and if unrestrained would result in the regulation of a
subject which has been given over to Congress; and that if
such power over contracts does not vest in Congress it must
reside either in the legislatures or courts of the states, which could
thereby exercise indirectly a conflicting and discriminating control
over interstate commerce.
The decision of this point is not based on authority, for the
question is a somewhat novel one; but it stands on sound principles.
The power to regulate a subject unquestionably must include the
power to regulate the right of contracts relating to that subject.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is vested in Congress
and the anti-trust law of I89o is a valid exercise of that power.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-RIGHT OF ATTORNEY TO COMMENT
UPON FAILURE TO CALL FAMILY PHYSICIAN.
The common law limited very closely the doctrine of privilege to
witnesses or communications. Indeed they were not really privi-
leges, but extensions of the rule that a party to a suit was incompe-
tent to testify for himself. The wife could not testify, being one
with the husband; the attorney, being agent and representative of
the party. With the relaxation of the rule on which they were
based they were modified and became pure privileges. But the law
refused to physicians this benefit. They could be compelled to go
upon the stand, and, once there, to disclose confidential professional
communications. Duchess of Kingston's Case,2o How. St. Trials 572.
New York was the first State to prohibit by statute "any doctor of
physic" from disclosing "any information acquired iri attending a
patient in a professional capacity," but allowing the patient to waive
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the privilege. Such is practically the language of the twenty states
that have passed similar laws ;--including Indiana. Gartside v.
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, 76 Mo. 446-Note. A
conflict exists as to whether the failure to call as a witness a person
to whom the privilege extends may be commented upon by the op-
posing attorney as raising a presumption that his evidence would be
against the interest of the party failing to call. The Master of the
Rolls in Wentworth v. Lloyd, io H. L. 589, endeavored to apply the
rule of Armory v. Delmaire, Strange 505, but the Lords reversed him
on the ground that the exclusion of such evidence was for the gen-
eral interest of the community. And in Freeman v. Fogg, 82 Me.
4o8, it was held proper for the court to refuse to allow comment
upon the fact that the attorney who had drawn the contract upon
which the plaintiff based her claim and the terms of which were in
dispute, had not been called as a witness. Or upon the failure of the
accused in a criminal trial to testify for himself. Wilson v. United
States, 149 U. S. 6o. Or failure to call his wife. Graves v. United
States, 150 U. S. 118. But Mr. Justice Brown based his decision on
the fact that the wife was not a competent witness and that the ac-
cused could not call her.
Here lies a partial standard by which to measure this right of
comment by counsel and one which will reconcile the opinions in
City of Warsaw v. Fisher, 55 N. E. 42, the case under review, where
it was held that, in an action for damages resulting from personal
injuries, counsel for defendant may properly comment upon plain-
tiff's failure to call as a witness his attending physician., He was not
incompetent as a witness and the plaintiff was basing his action upon
matters about which the testimony of this physician could fairly be pre-
sumed to be the best evidence obtainable. It was within the plaintiff's
power and his only to call him as a witness. The rule is that, if a
party has it peculiarly within his power to produce a witness, the
fact that he does not do it creates the presumption that the testi-
mony, if produced, would be unfavorable. i Starkie on Evidence
54. Presumptions are auxiliary evidence and may therefore be
commented upon by counsel.
But it is argued that this is to change a privilege to a snare and
practically defeat a statute by a rule of practice. Not so. The pur-
pose of the statute is to inspire confidence between the patient and
physician. Will any patient be deterred from stating his symptoms
by the knowledge of this rule? To extend an absolute privilege
without right of comment to cases of this kind would be to encour-
age baseless litigation and promote damage suits now altogether too
frequent and slightly grounded.
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SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS FOR OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT-LAW
GIVING RIGHT TO BE IDEMNIFIED BY -MUNICIPALITY UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL.
In the recent case of it re Jenson, 6o N. Y. Supp. 933, the Su-
preme Court of New York declares the Ahern Act to be unconsti-
tutional because it provides retrospectively for alleged claims against
the municipality and authorizes taxation for purposes not public in
their nature. This act in substance provided for the defrayal of ex-
penses of legal proceedings paid or incurred by certain officers and
officials of the state and of the cities and counties thereof, and en-
abling them to obtain a reimbursement, either from the city, county
or state treasury, as the case may be, for reasonable counsel fees
and expenses paid or incurred in any trial or proceeding to remove
from office, or any prosecution for a crime alleged to have been
committed in the-performance of official duties, or in connection
therewith, in which trial or proceeding the prosecuted officer had
been successful. The act also provided for th& levying of a tax to
meet such reimbursements.
It has long since been well settled that the taxing power can
be exercised only to raise money for a purpose that in some sense
at least can be said to be public. Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wal. 655.
In the present case, the court in deciding that the levy of a tax to
meet such reimbursements was not one for a public purpose, takes
into consideration the novelty of the idea and the fact that courts
must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the govern-
ment, the objects for which taxes have been customarily levied,
what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the
support and for the proper use of the government, whether state or
municipal, and concludes that never yet has a purpose of this char-
acter been included among the objects for which taxes have been
customarily levied.
It has never been deemed essential that claims against the state
or municipality bear a legal character, but the same, if supported
by a moral obligation and founded in justice, where the power ex-
ists to create them but the proper statutory proceedings are not
strictly pursued or for any reason are informal or defective, may
be legalized by the legislature, and enforced, either against the state
itself or any of its political divisions, through the judicial tribunals.
The justness of this proposition is obvious. But in the case under
review, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find any obligation what-
ever, legal, equitable, or moral, on the part of the state or any of its
municipalities, to make such reimbursement, and such payment
would therefore be open to the objection of being a mere gratuity.
YALE LA IV JOURNAL.
The courts have at all times been open to private individuals
to recover any damages incurred by reason of a prosecution against
them, whenever they are able to establish all of the elements essen-
tial to an action for malicious prosecution. Even in case of estab-
lished innocence, the views which have thus far prevailed have
been that he who is criminally prosecuted with apparently good
cause must bear the burden of his own defense, as a part of the
price he pays for the protective influences of our institutions of
government. This sense of hardship has never been regarded as
iaising an equitable claim against the state for a reimbursement on
the part of any acquitted defendant, generally in criminal cases, and
it is impossible to perceive any distinction in favor of officers prose-
cuted for official misconduct which should give rise to a moral obli-
gatibn in their case not existing in favor of non-official defendants.
The court, in the opinion handed down, makes reference to, but
does not decide, the fact that it may be that purely prospective legis-
lation announcing the intention of the state to pay such expenses
incurred in future cases would be deemed expressive of a public
purpose, and that the assurance thus given might be regarded as
creating such an obligation as to relieve the subsequent payment
from the objection that it was a mere gratuity.
VICE-PRINCIPAL--CONDUCTOR OF A FREIGHT TRAIN-NEW ENGLAND
R. R. CO. V. CONROY, 20 SUP. CT. REP. 85.
No little confusion in the law governing the liability of a master
for injuries caused by the negligence of fellow servants is cleared
up by this decision, handed down in December by the United
States Supreme Court. In general the rule adhered to by this
court, following the current of authority in this country and Eng-
land, has been that the master is not liable to the servant unless
the servant whose neglect caused the injury is "one who was
clothed with the control and management of a distinct department,
and not a mere separate piece of work in one of the branches of
service in a department." Northern P. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S.
346. At the same time, however, the decision in Chicago, M. & St.
P. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, in which it was held that an en-
gineer could recover from the company for the negligence of the
conductor of the train, on the ground that the latter is a vice-prin-
cipal, though in conflict with the doctrine upheld in other cases, has
never been overruled in terms.
The court now decides that it was overruled in effect by the case
of B. & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, where a fireman was not
allowed to recover from the company for injuries caused by the
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negligence of his engineer occupying the position of "ad interim
conductor." The perplexity caused by these inharmonious de-
cisions is well illustrated in the earlier stages of the present case.
The trial court instructed the jury that under the rule of the Su-
preme Court the conductor of a freight train is a vice-principal.
On appeal the judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit were unable to decide the point and referred it to the Su-
preme Court. This court has done well in now definitively over-
ruling the Ross case and affirming that it cannot under the ordinary
conditions of railroading "hold a conductor of a freight train to be
a vice-principal within any safe definition of that relation."
Justice Harlan, who concurred in the decision of the Ross case,
dissents on the ground that the control of a conductor over a train
is sufficient to render him a vice-principal. This view, if logically
applied, would make almost any boss over a particular piece of
work in a department stand in that position. The conductor of a
train is under instructions from train operators and other officials
and is in no wise superintendent of a department. That the mas-
ter is liable for the gross negligence of a servant of superior rank
is held in Ohio, Kentucky, and perhaps a few other states. But the
weight of authority is strongly the other way. On principle, it
would seem that the reason for the qualification to the rule of non-
liability of the master for negligence of fellow servants, which is
made in the case of a vice-principal, extends only to such superin-
tendents as for all purpose relating to the control of the department
and servants in it, stand in the shoes of the principal. A servant,
of no matter how high grade, himself under the control of other
servants, does not hold that position.
The case is a valuable one for its review of the authorities on the
whole subject of the liability of master to servant.
CIVIL SERVICE OF CITIES-APPOINTMENTS FROM ELIGIBLE LISTS.
Since the inauguration of the civil service legislation, the ques-
tion as to eligibility to appointment to public offices has often found
its way into the courts. In this connection the recent case of People
et rel. Balcom v. Mosher et al., 61 N. Y. Supp. 452, is of some interest,
in that the court interprets the provisions of the Constitution of the
State of New York, relative to this question, and declares that the
statute and civil service rules, passed in pursuance thereof, provid-
ing for the appointment of the person graded highest on the proper
eligible list, is in conflict with the Constitution of the state.
The Constitution, Art. 5, Sec. 9, in substance provides That the
appointments in the civil service of the state shall be according to
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merit and fitness, ascertained so far as practicable by competitive
examination. The statute and rules above cited can readily be
harmonized with this section. But the Constitution, Art. io, Sec.
2, makes a further provision that "all city, town and village officers,
whose election or appointment is not provided' for by this Constitu-
tion, shall be elected by the electors of such city * * * or ap-
pointed by such authorities thereof, as the legislature shall designate for
that purpose." This provision clearly contemplates some degree of
discretion as to the personnel of the appointee. The statute and
rules are therefore in conflict with this provision.
It will be found upon an examination that, prior to the adoption
of the Amendments to the Constitution, which are now under con-
sideration, the practical construction of the then existing civil
service laws, requiring appointments to be made as the result of
competitive examinations, was not to compel the appointment of
the person standing highest upon the list, as a result of such exam-
ination, but permitted- the selection of one out of a limited number
of those standing highest upon the list. The object of these civil
service rules was to reduce the opportunities for favoritism to the
lowest point deemed possible, yet to leave some degree of discretion
and responsibility for the appointment in the officer making it.
In endeavoring to ascertain the intention of the law-makers
upon any given subject, the history of the times, and of the subject,
and of the laws and customs in relation to it, if any existed, the pro-
ceedings of the law-makers, and the evils intended to be corrected,-
and the good to be accomplished, must be considered. It is a
familiar rule of construction, that the framers of constitutions and
statutes are presumed to have a knowledge of existing laws, and
that the instruments that they frame and adopt, are framed and
adopted in reference to such existing laws.
After a lengthy review of the authorities and also a short his-
torical discussion of civil service legislation, the court comes to the
conclusion that there can be no doubt that in adopting the Amend-
ments of the Constitution, the framers intended to continue the
hitherto uniform rule as to "at least a limited and restricted dis-
cretionary power," and not to compel the appointment of the one
highest upon the eligible list, and thereby also deprive the appoint-
ing authority of the very essence of the power elsewhere granted.
The decision in thus reconciling these provisions of the Consti-
tution, clearly elucidates the rigidness with which that fundamental
rule of construction, namely, that in interpreting the Constitution,
it is to be considered as a whole, complete in itself, and force and
effect must be given to every provision contained in it, is applied.
